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Emergences: Towards a Cognitive Affective Model for Creativity in the Arts 
Nigel McLoughlin 
 
Creativity is defined as the production of something innovative or novel that is adjudged to 
be an appropriate or useful addition to some domain of endeavour. Within that definition, 
creativity may be thought of as existing in several different manifestations: it is an inherent 
set of traits in the person; it is the process of generating the innovation or artefact; it is a 
quality of the actual artefact that is made; it is the result of the judgment of those in power 
who deem it to be creative; and it is the addition that the artefact makes to the cultural 
definition of creativity within the domain of endeavour1. This should alert us to the fact that 
what we call creativity it actually a complex compound of processes which are related to 
culture, power and social processes, and genetic factors, as well as cognitive and embodied 
processes. These cannot be cleanly separated from each other.  
Any cognitive process involved in the generation of a creative output will include 
biases and predispositions which are culturally acquired and which will direct the individual’s 
thinking towards one kind of output more than another. This may be illustrated in cultures 
where connection to a tradition is especially valued. In such conditions creative individuals 
are less likely to produce outputs that radically depart from or challenge the domain within 
which the work is produced, because such outputs are less likely to be seen as creative. In 
other words, they may be adjudged novel, but not useful or appropriate. In more permissive 
cultures, radical departure and challenge are encouraged and so the cognitive processes of 
individuals working within those cultures may make more use of strategies such as remote 
association and divergent thinking. 
Because of this, attempts at satisfactorily defining creativity in order to measure it are 
often fraught with difficulties, but researchers have generally settled on two criteria, novelty 
and appropriateness. However, if one focuses the definition on the creative product, then 
there is the problem of external judgment, and who undertakes that judgment, when, and 
under what conditions. If one focuses on the process by which novel and appropriate ideas or 
artefacts are generated within the individual, one is dependent on the individual’s ability to 
judge the worth of their own production, since the process may be defined as any course of 
action which produces the novel and appropriate artefact. For this reason, in what follows I 
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focus on the production of metaphors in the creative arts, because while the judgment of 
appropriateness is subjective to the individual artist, and the judgment of novelty still 
dependent on their knowledge of their field, one can assume that experienced artists are 
qualified and able to judge such outputs. The judgment of experienced practitioners has been 
referred to as the ‘gold standard’ in the consensual assessment technique for measuring 
creativity in relation to poetry and visual art2  
In terms of metaphor production, the initial generation of metaphor tends to happen 
by insight. It is apparently spontaneous and unconscious, with the work of selecting between 
metaphors, and improving on them occurring after they come into consciousness and subject 
to attentional and analytic thought processes. This chapter will outline a possible model to 
account for the initial subconscious phase of metaphor generation, drawing on the current 
theories and evidence from cognitive science and neuroscience, in order to understand both 
the cognitive aspects of insight in metaphor generation, while also accounting for the 
emotional aspects of the process of making creative art, and the associated reward 
experienced by the artist in making the artefact. Because I am a practicing poet, most of my 
examples will be drawn from that discipline. 
In her tripartite division of creativity into combinatorial, exploratory and 
transformational creativity, Margaret Boden 3 asserts that poetic imagery is a form of 
combinational creativity that generates a form of statistical surprise.  Good imagery surprises 
because of its aesthetic difference from the norm in terms of linguistic expression. In this 
model, new variations on a poetic form, such as tailed sonnets, are classified as exploratory 
creativity, because new structures have been created using existing rules through a process of 
exploring the boundaries of the current form. Her third type, transformational creativity 
relates to paradigmatic change through the creation of structures or versions of a system that 
were previously thought impossible. One might relate this to the invention of new forms of 
poetry, but also perhaps to the creation of images and metaphors which are very surreal, 
extremely counter-intuitive, or impossiblist in some way. These types may also occur in 
concert or in combination to produce a new artefact.  
Neuroscience has begun to investigate what happens during the creative process, and 
while this is useful to a point, we need to be careful in the conclusions we draw. All of the 
brain is active all of the time, and brain imaging techniques tend to work by subtraction, so 
they miss diffuse activation because it gets averaged out, and it is often not possible to say for 
certain whether activation is excitatory or inhibitory. That said, it is possible to combine 
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neuroscientific evidence with other neuropsychological evidence, and evidence from 
cognitive psychology, in order to generate workable (and testable) hypotheses.  
For example, Carlsson et al4 showed that highly creative individuals tended to show 
bilateral activation in the frontal lobes while less creative individuals showed left-lateralised 
activation when engaged in creative tasks. This supports the view that the right frontal lobe is 
more involved in non-verbal representations while the left may exert control and evaluative 
functions. Both of these are necessary for truly creative endeavours. Reverberi et al5 found 
that patients with prefrontal cortex damage performed better than healthy individuals in 
solving insight problems. This evidence can be taken to show that inhibition of frontal lobe 
processes can enhance creative thinking through the removal of online monitoring and 
evaluation processes. So how does this square with the Carlsson et al study? It may be that 
relatively increased activation of the right frontal areas could occur either through normal 
processing modes which balance the left (and so make it much less dominant) or, as 
Reverberi et al suggest, through damage to mechanisms that limit the response space, which 
tend to be more left lateralised. Carlsson et al also found a negative correlation between 
divergent thinking performance and activation in frontal regions in one of their experimental 
tasks. This might indicate that lowering activation in frontal lobes frees up divergent thinking 
processes by opening up the response space through thought processes becoming less 
directed and allowing a more diffuse activation pattern and a more freely associative thought 
structure. Or, because similar results have been found with regard to intelligence more 
generally6, it might indicate that those who perform better at divergent thinking tasks use 
these cerebral networks more efficiently, with lower energy demands7. 
 
Frontal Lobes and Disinhibition 
The prefrontal cortex can be seen as actively controlling access to concepts and experiences 
stored in other areas of the brain and making these available to working memory and thereby 
making them available for conscious attention8. Dietrich9 points out that the prefrontal cortex 
is also been shown to be active in representations of belief systems and cultural values, and as 
such the material made available for the task may be selected at least in part by a mechanism 
that allows previous experiences, cultural norms, expectations and biases, to constrain the 
search for relevant material.10 These may be partly responsible for constructing the biases 
which act to narrow down the response spaces that Reverberi et al referred to, by inhibiting 
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what is culturally unacceptable or not valuable, or areas which are assumed to be irrelevant or 
inappropriate to the task.  
Such biases can be problematic for generating a creative response since they may well 
lead to what is often referred to as ‘satisficing’, or producing a response that we know will 
satisfy the conditions required but may not be truly innovative. Good examples of this are to 
be found in the design on the first railway carriages, which bore striking resemblance to horse 
drawn stage coaches, including having the conductors sit outside, or the fact that when most 
people are asked to draw aliens they tend to be bipedal and symmetrical This is taken to 
result from starting with typical category examples, which are supported by episodic retrieval 
processes, or analysis of features11.  Instructions to focus on abstract qualities such as ‘life 
support’ or ‘nutrition mechanisms’ tend to produce more novel examples, as does introducing 
rules which prevent the use of most readily accessible solutions and which open up the 
problem space12. 
This suggests that if the prefrontal functions were suspended, as they are when 
dreaming, daydreaming or in certain altered states of consciousness, then the search for 
material may take longer because it is unconstrained but the chances of a more truly 
innovative outcome would be increased. Martindale13 suggested just such a mechanism 
whereby creative people are capable of entering a different mental state that is conducive to 
creativity. He describes this state as being characterised by a lower level of cortical arousal in 
the frontal lobes than normal14. This means that the activation is more diffuse and widespread 
in the brain, because the normal frontal processes that tend to inhibit this widespread 
activation in order to focus thought, have themselves been inhibited. This creates an 
environment where there is less inhibition of remote associative thought, thereby generating 
more novelty and an increased chance of new and appropriate associations. This is the basis 
of the disinhibition hypothesis. In what Csikszentmihalyi15 describes as ‘flow’, the focus is 
internal, utterly consumed by the task, and awareness of the external diminishes. The creative 
individual is absorbed in a sufficiently challenging task, and is enjoying the task for the 
reward that it brings through the challenge of doing it. This too is a mental state that may be 
induced by inhibition of frontal processes16.  
A mechanism connected to the norepinephrine system in the brain has been proposed 
whereby disinhibition can happen. The frontal area responsible has been identified as the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. From here there are connections in the brain that modulate the 
locus coeruleus, where norepinephrine levels are regulated. The locus coeruleus drives 
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norepinephrine production in two different ways: It has a tonic role, which constantly 
produces a certain level of norepinephrine, and a phasic or transitory role, which can increase 
alertness by temporarily increasing norepinephrine production. Activation in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex increases production and therefore attention by acting to stimulate the locus 
coeruleus17. Heilman et al18 suggest that this increases the signal-to-noise ratio by narrowing 
the variety of concepts accessed. Decreasing activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
can act to decrease stimulation of the locus coeruleus and thereby decrease norepinephrine 
production and decrease attentional focus19 and they argue that decreasing levels of 
norepinephrine can lead to the discovery of novel relationships20. Heilman et al also suggest 
that creative people may store extensive specialised knowledge in the temporo-parietal 
regions; and they may have better ability to frontally modulate norepinephrine levels through 
the frontal locus coeruleus pathways21 thereby creating a state where there is reduced signal-
to-noise, and access to a wider network of concepts is possible. The dopamine system may 
also play an important role. Flaherty22 suggests that one possible reason why dopamine 
antagonists suppress creativity is that dopamine promotes voluntary pursuit of goals and 
inhibits behaviours that might interfere with that pursuit. It is unsurprising that short phasic 
activation patterns in the dopamine neurons have also been found in relation to reward23. 
Essentially, one would expect reward and goal pursuit systems to be linked because 
expectation of reward would drive goal directed behavior to achieve it. However, increases in 
dopamine levels cause external focus and alertness, while decreased levels favour a more 
introspective mode of thought24. It is possible that these two systems may act in concert, to 
promote defocused attention and introspective thought, task motivation, and also external 
focus for more convergent processes, as well as to induce the mental states Martindale and 
Csikszentmihalyi describe. 
  
Neurds and Nodes 
One of the more recent models to explain how creativity can emerge from neural 
representations has been proposed by Gabora & Ranjan25. They outline a mechanism based 
on distributed but co-activating neural cliques and ‘neurds’, which encode non-prototypical 
but related aspects of a concept. This model is based on two qualities of the neural storage 
system for information in the brain. Firstly, memories are encoded through activation of 
neurons that are maximally sensitive to small ranges of basic features called microfeatures. 
Each neuron responds best to very low-level basic information such as a particular pitch or 
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orientation. Each neuron is ‘tuned’ to respond best to this one particular microfeature, but 
they also respond to a lesser degree to a variety of microfeatures that are close to their most 
favoured one. Likewise, that neuron’s neighbours, which are maximally tuned to slightly 
different frequencies or orientations, will also respond to some degree to their neighbour 
neuron’s favoured tuning point. This means that representations in memory are distributed 
over many cells and that there is a certain amount of redundancy in the system, so that if one 
neuron dies, information is not lost. Neurons also get engaged in different capacities by being 
activated to different degrees by different stimuli that contain features close to, or exactly 
matching their tuning point. This means that they are capable of forming points of overlap 
between the representations of different stimuli and concepts26. 
Secondly, memory is ‘content addressable’. There is a consistent relationship between 
the conceptual content to be encoded and the pattern of activated neurons that represent it in 
the brain. Because the network contains some redundancy and noise, memory is never 
retrieved exactly as it was encoded, because it will be subtly affected by all the experiences 
that happened between its original encoding, previous re-activations and its subsequent re-
activations. The meaning of a representation is also subtly influenced by other concepts that 
activate networks of neurons that include some of the same neurons as the original 
representation does. This explains why memory can be both generally reliable but also 
unreliable in terms of detailed recall27. 
For Gabora and Ranjan, creativity occurs by a mechanism which echoes Koestler’s 
description of a ‘bisociation’ of ‘two different matrices of thought’28, whereby two different 
concepts, linked to different association contexts are activated simultaneously through the 
commonalities between them, and this initial idea is then passed to the more convergent 
processes of ‘effortful’ creativity. In the generative phase, they assert, cross-talk between the 
neurons can be constrained by a centred radial basal function in which activation spreads out 
a certain width in all dimensions. Spiky activations have small widths and high activations at 
the centre, while flat activations have large spread and relatively low activations across the 
spread. As they point out29, this idea of flatter and spikier activations is in line with the theory 
posited by Mednik in 196230, whereby flatter activational hierarchies afford greater remote 
association and thereby promote creativity, while spiky activations promote more focused 
thought through fewer potential associations between only highly activated and therefore 
highly salient representations. As Gabora and Ranjan posit, this might favour explicit 
information and the identification of causal relationships for example, while the flatter 
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hierarchies may favour implicit information. The majority of the time, in directed thought, 
many neurds are excluded from assembles of activated cells but in associative thought more 
neurds can be brought into play, enabling access to more non-prototypical aspects, allowing 
thoughts to become more far ranging and quickly ranged over31. 
Martindale32 has developed a similar model, which describes a set of nodes in varying 
states of activation, although he proposes that the most activated nodes are the focus of 
attention while the less activated nodes may be in the attentional periphery. These nodes 
exhibit a pattern of excitatory or inhibitory connection and exhibit sigmoidal activation which 
progresses towards an asymptotic maximum. These are subject to learning mechanisms such 
as Hebbian learning (through mutual activation) and inhibitory learning. These nodes occur 
in a number of environments through their presence in various modular structures within the 
brain33. Martindale uses this model to explain the aesthetic pleasure and displeasure 
experienced through a number of aesthetic effects.  
Martindale illustrates the process using an example drawn from music where he 
shows how musical consonance may operate through nodes which reinforce each other in 
activation networks because they activate notes in harmonic relation. Some of the frequencies 
of one note are also activated by the presence of another note, thereby increasing overall 
activation. Musical dissonance, on the other hand, is thought to result from nodes which are 
in inhibitory relation because they are near neighbours in terms of the pitch to which they 
best respond. In order for pitch to be sharply perceived, inhibitory connections exist between 
near neighbours so that the note can stand out. Dissonance results from mutual inhibition of 
the neurons in the neural network that respond to frequencies which are too close together34. 
In this model, activation is inherently pleasurable while inhibition is inherently 
displeasurable. In a similar way, alliteration causes fatigue through repeated activation of the 
same nodes if it occurs too often, and this is perceived as displeasurable, but if it occurs far 
enough apart then it can cause repeated activation after refractory periods have ended and so 
be pleasurable. The same is true for rhyme. Meaningfulness is pleasurable for the same 
reason that gestalt figures are pleasureable: they increase overall activation by activating 
more nodes within the system, and metaphor activates more nodes through remote 
association, and therefore ‘original’ metaphors are perceived as more aesthetically 
pleasurable35. Pleasurable in this sense must be linked in some way to the brain’s evaluative 
systems which are discussed below. 
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Pleasure, Reward and Affect 
The research into reward has shown that both the expectation of a reward and the anticipated 
size of the reward can be represented in the brain through learning from prior reward 
situations36 and that these representations may be encoded in dorsal basal ganglia circuitry37, 
and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and striatum38. Research also indicates that we make 
judgements on complex stimuli such as music in relation to three axes of representation: we 
appear to represent how pleasing or rewarding something is; how active something is (often 
in terms of speed and unpredictability); and how potent something is (often qualitatively 
expressed in terms of strength, vigour and boldness)39. This effect would appear to cross 
culture and expertise levels and constitutes a very visceral way of internally representing and 
evaluating complex stimuli40. These three factors may well map onto neurophysiological 
systems related to reward, threat perception and uncertainty calculation. The reward system 
encodes pleasurability, threat encodes size, strength or danger; and the uncertainty system 
deals with movement and predictabiity.  
Similar systems have also been described by Damasio41 in his somatic marker 
hypothesis and can be connected to what Damasio calls the ‘as if body loop’. This 
representationally combines the emotional and decision making processes of the brain by 
forming a feedback loop connected to the body’s physiological resonse mechanisms which 
operate at both conscious and unconscious levels. This is partly what we refer to as gut 
feeling and the theory is that we ‘feel’ emotionally (and in a vestigial sense physically) the 
potential effects for us of a set of current or future circumstances in the real world42  in order 
to assess the potential reward or punishment that might follow. This system may also be 
involved in generating empathic responses43 and other researchers have suggested the 
involvement of these systems in the ways that we perceive and evaluate art44. It only requires 
a small extension of the imagination to speculate that such processes may also be responsible 
at least in part for matching creative outcomes generated against the representation of what is 
intended to be created. A sucessful match might well activate reward systems and enter 
conscious awareness through the processes proposed by Martindale along with a concurrent 
release of dopamine sufficient to promote the activation responsible into attentional focus45. 
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Towards a Cognitive Affective Model 
So given the evidence for how these systems operate, what might a cognitive affective model 
of creative insight which sets out to integrate these systems look like? And how might it 
achieve insight through the process that has been referred to in the study of creativity since 
Wallas46 as incubation? If the supervisory and directing processes of the prefrontal cortex are 
deactivated, it is much more likely that the processes of thought will be unconscious, since 
there is no active use of material in working memory. Without engagement of working 
memory, thoughts tend to make it to consciousness through a competitive spreading 
activation model, which may be thought of in terms of neurons becoming synchronised as 
activation spreads to other neurons with which they share strong connections, until a certain 
critical level of activation is passed and the activation passes the threshold at which it 
becomes conscious47. Therefore, one would expect only some very salient output to suddenly 
become conscious in the way that we experience it in insight.  
What is immediately salient to an expert will often be missed by the novice, however. 
Expertise may be defined as the internalisation of a set of skills and practices to such an 
extent that they can proceed without conscious awareness. Sometimes, it might prove very 
difficult for the expert to articulate the process when asked. This is because these processes 
now form part of the expert’s implicit system. The explicit system requires working memory, 
and is capable of processing about four chunks of information at a time. The implicit system 
is not limited in the same way with regard to the capacity of information it is capable of 
handling48. Consider for example, coin dealers who specialise in gold sovereigns. A dealer 
can often spot a fake coin very quickly. In order to do so, they are using internalised 
information regarding the coin’s colour, weight, feel, sound, and often more explicit 
information such as impossible year and mint mark combinations. The decision is often 
instantaneous and the exact reason is sometimes difficult to articulate, but is often described 
in terms of something not feeling right or something ‘off’ about the coin that attracts their 
attention. Novice coin collectors tend to resort to scales, calipers, neodymium magnets, 
jeweller’s eyeglasses, catalogues, and other such aids, until they have handled enough of the 
coin to be confident and comfortable, until they have internalised the sensory skills and 
explicit knowledge into the implicit system. A similar process happens when we learn to 
drive. We depend very much on the explicit system at first, we are conscious of having to 
clutch, change gear, and use ‘mirror, signal, manoeuvre’ until we internalise the skill-set. 
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Then driving becomes much less effortful, and we are largely unconscious of the individual 
operations we perform when we drive, until something unusual happens and we are alerted to 
it. This may be thought of as statistical surprise, because something unexpected has cropped 
up, and that immediately engages the attentional focus.  
There is evidence that thought processes related to goal pursuit can operate outside 
awareness49. What happens unconsciously may be thought of in the following terms: there is 
a neural representation of the problem, there is a neural representation of the conditions 
which a solution must fill and or might fill, and there is a neural representation of the 
anticipated rewards attached to the achievement of the goal state. The process is about 
finding a neural representation of the conditions that will change the problem as represented 
into something that closely matches the goal, perhaps using the goal state to provide some 
constraint on the associative processes involved50. When this happens, the reward circuits are 
activated; and there may also be an activation of dopamine-based reward systems51 that are 
sufficient to promote the mental activity that caused the release to conscious awareness52. At 
that point we suddenly see the solution. This might be a workable theory for insight 
problems, but what about the generation of works of art? In the arts we do not have clearly 
defined problems; we often do not have any clear idea what the solution to our ill-defined 
problem might be. Even so, the arts do have a set of internalised practices and skills which 
are implicit in that they are acquired through the act of practice rather than consciously 
learned, are often difficult to articulate or describe, but which form part of the expert artist’s 
practice nonetheless. So, what kind of representation might we be talking about in this 
instance?   
In their concluding remarks, Gabora and Ranjan53 admit that the model, good as it is, 
is incomplete because it does not explain the role of motivation or the emotions. However, 
since they assert that in ‘a situation that is relevant to multiple representations, they merge 
together’54 because of the mutual activation of the neural commonalities, or cross-talk, 
between them, one could move up a level from the neural representations to the level of 
mental spaces, which can be thought of as fleeting representations of images and concepts 
encoded in the way Gabora and Ranjan suggest. Merging of multiple representations through 
situational connection in this sense suggests a form of conceptual blending55  and conceptual 
combination has been recognised as an important part of the creative process, especially in 
models such as Geneplore56, while Shaughnessy and Trimingham observe the blending of 
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ideas through practice in this volume. Gabora and Ranjan’s ideas may, in turn, explain how 
input spaces are linked at a neuronal level in a blend. Neuronal representations of emotions 
can be envisaged as consisting of the same type of representations as memory in Gabora and 
Ranjan’s model. The microfeatures in this case may be related to activation of neurons 
related to physiological features, as in Damasio’s ‘as if body loop’, and these too will be 
tuned in the same way to respond to not just a single microfeature, but variably to a range of 
them. Considering that concepts can have an ‘emotional valence’ through their linkages with 
the physiological and emotional memories they evoke, as well as their episodic memory, it is 
credible that separate representations of emotionally loaded images can also be merged or 
blended through the ‘cross-talk’ of their common emotional neural activation patterns. By a 
further extension, one might posit that at a cultural level, symbols could operate through 
many individuals learning to attach the same values, and associative or metaphoric qualities, 
to certain culturally prevalent concepts, which are represented and linked similarly in many 
individuals. 
Conceptual blending theory allows us to understand a wide range of conceptual 
phenomena such as jokes, counterfactual ideas, and metaphors, in terms of mappings between 
mental spaces, which allow emergences of novel structure and connections at the conceptual 
level. Mental spaces are conceived as temporary representational structures constructed by 
the participants in a language act to represent perceived or imagined situations in the past, 
present or future. Fauconnier and Turner describe four spaces: the two input spaces of the 
source and the target; a generic space, which represents the abstract commonalities between 
the two input spaces; and a blend space. The two input spaces contain specific features. If we 
extend this beyond language acts, and apply it to any conceptual representation in the mind, 
then in the neuropsychological terms discussed earlier, these may be thought of as arrays of 
activated neurons that encode the stored features of the two input spaces in memory. The 
generic space contains abstract features common to the two input spaces, which may be 
thought of as representing the activated arrays from the two sets of input features which are 
common to both. The blend space contains a compression of the common features, and also 
contains emergent structure from the specific features. These may be thought of in terms of 
additional activation of other neuronal arrays, through spreading activation from the original 
input spaces and the representation of common features through the associative system of the 
brain, which produces activation not originally present in either original ‘input’ array but 
which is strongly associated with their combination. Line and Per Aage Brandt57 further 
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developed the notion of mental spaces to include a mechanism for signification. Their 
approach combines conceptual metaphor theory and conceptual blending theory with 
cognitive semiotics with particular regard to metaphor. This affords the addition of a semiotic 
space that allows the conceptual blend to accrue meaning as a sign. One might suggest that 
this represents the activation of semantic and cultural associations of the image or blend in 
neuropsychological terms. Brandt and Brandt’s version of blending includes a mechanism 
which supports the directionality of the metaphor in terms of target and source. It also states 
that the model be similarly applied in receiver and originator. This is useful for our purposes, 
because the creative individual is the originator of the metaphor, but also its first receiver, 
because they must attempt to understand the metaphor they create before communicating it to 
others.  
By combining what these several systems tell us about how the brain may represent 
concepts and how those cognitive acts and representations might interact with the 
physiological, emotional and affective systems of the brain, I propose the following cognitive 
affective model, represented diagrammatically in figure 1, which seems to me to logically 
emerge from the research previously discussed and which is capable of describing an 
integrated mechanism whereby the separate systems may combine to produce complex 
artistic creative output. In his model of the neuroscience of creativity, Dietrich58 separates 
insights according to how they may be classified as arising from two different processing 
modes (deliberate and spontaneous) and two different knowledge domains (cognitive and 
emotional). This gives four possibilities: deliberate cognitive, deliberate emotional, 
spontaneous cognitive, and spontaneous emotional, depending on whether the insight is 
produced by conscious or unconscious thought processes, and whether the insight itself has a 
cognitive or emotional manifestation. The model I propose suggests an integrated blending 
mechanism, by which spontaneous emotional insight might arise, manifested in an 
appropriate representative symbol or objective correlative, with regard to representational and 
verbal art, in effect creating both spontaneous cognitive and spontaneous emotional insight at 
the same time. The poet’s problem is solved, as both the objective correlative and its 
appropriate emotion are realised. 
The model is speculative of course, but if writers can’t speculate on how the creative 
process works, well, who can: 
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Figure 1: Cognitive-Affective Model  
                of Creative Insight. 
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Say one is trying to write a poem in order to convey to the reader an emotional state. 
Take, for example, a poem on the death of a loved one. In order to get across what one feels 
about the death, one needs one or more objective correlatives59, a set of images that will 
evoke in the reader the desired emotional response, so they feel what you feel – the set of 
emotions you intend to convey. The process of writing involves searching for appropriate 
vehicles that will convey aspects of the complex emotional response, and that search is 
modulated by frontal mechanisms (A) that can focus in or open up the problem space, so that 
suitable representations of the necessary vehicles are generated. This process can either be 
conscious, thinking through the problem methodically, or it might be much more unconscious 
and involve switching between the two different modes of thought, through the disinhibition 
mechanism discussed earlier. Given that there can be representations of emotional states 
encoded in the brain in vestigial form as Damasio proposes, which allow us to represent these 
states without the need to fully experience them, and given that these emotional 
representations may be matched against the emotional representations associated with, or 
engendered by novel images which can be created by remote associative mechanisms, this 
provides a means to internally and unconsciously test how well the image may stand for the 
emotion through increases in activation of neuron groups which are common to both the 
novel (source) and the target emotional representations. This suggests that we might mentally 
try out images (C) against the representations of loneliness, grief, or other connected concepts 
(B) to see if they can be mapped onto each other through the abstract representation (D), in 
effect carrying out a series of blends, where the level of activation in the generic space, which 
encodes commonality, indicates the level of fit with the target emotional valence. The novel 
and the target representations act as input spaces, in blending theory terms. A metaphoric 
match occurs where there is the best-fit from the candidate novel structure with the target 
space, and so the metaphor finds its most appropriate source image through different 
associative iterations of that blending process.  
Sometimes an emergent sign may be generated from a blend of two metaphoric 
images, for example a single swan from the representation of loneliness, and an iced over 
lake which might be evocative of ‘life suspended’. When brought together in a further blend 
space may generate an emergence, such as the swan reflected in the ice (E), which might 
evoke the memory of the ‘other half’, ‘the missing mate’. This in turn could suggest an image 
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of the pair and the single in the same space, which is emotionally resonant as a sign (F). The 
reflection is not present in either image alone, but emerges from the blend of the two original 
metaphoric images to give something new and resonant, and capable of acting as a sign with 
emotional valence. This new image may have more co-activation with the target emotional 
representation at the abstract emotional level than either of the first two alone. In effect, the 
image becomes an acceptable objective correlative through the number of shared activations 
that its attached emotional valence has with the target emotion. This is represented 
diagrammatically in figure 2 below: 
In this diagram of the wider process, the emotional valence evoked by the sign may 
fulfill conditions represented in the emotional goal state (G in Figure 1), so that the image 
matches the required objective correlative. Again this may be an emergent property of the 
two representations in the input spaces being combined to give a sufficiently increased 
activation level in the neuronal arrays, so that attentional processes are activated and the 
resonant sign ‘pops up’ as an insight. There may also be a set of artistic goal conditions, 
which the generated image must fulfill, related to novelty and the poet’s knowledge of their 
field (H). If both conditions are activated, this increased activation could stimulate the reward 
pathways (both emotional and aesthetic) (I) sufficiently so that the image can spring into 
consciousness. This may be because the increase of activation or its reinforcement is 
inherently pleasurable as Martindale suggests, and this in turn may be thought of in terms of 
providing the autotelic experience described by Csikszentmihalyi as pleasure inherent in the 
task itself.  
Since there will be internalised cultural norms and expectations, which will form part 
of the associative pattern and the overall activation array, there may also be processes 
whereby these norms may be flouted, either consciously or unconsciously. This might allow 
us to generate a sense of novelty through not having a great deal of overlap with other 
activation structures stored in memory, which relate to our knowledge of the wider field, and 
what has been previously done in poems. These will undoubtedly have some effect on the 
associative connections made, but they are not likely to act in a prohibitive manner, since the 
way the activation systems seem to operate in the brain, and the way activation seems to 
spread through the system, is based on statistical and probabilistic processes.  
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Figure 2: Example of emotional valence and image blending. 
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Speculative as such a model is, it is a thought experiment, grounded in the 
neuropsychological evidence, and what appears to be an appropriate cognitive model, I hope 
that it offers a way of thinking about how the cognitive and emotional processes might 
interact in the making of verbal, and by extension, other forms of representational art, while 
also allowing space in the model for ‘expertise’ effects which are themselves not straight 
forward. It also allows for mechanisms by which unconscious and cultural biases may feed 
into and influence the process. The proposed model is extremely fluid, and inherently 
iterative and recursive, because levels of activation in one part will change activations in the 
other parts of the model through spreading activation over very short periods of time. It might 
be thought of as a fluid system constantly in motion, but which, through bottom-up 
attentional processes described earlier, allow snapshots to emerge, as fully formed images 
and metaphors, already carrying emotional valence and a semiotic weight, which can then be 
recorded and worked upon by the conscious, convergent, thought processes of the writer, who 
can then use the material, change it, feed it back into the unconscious, associative, and 
divergent system in order to generate more novel images from the sea of constantly 
fluctuating unconscious thought.     
(6186) 
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